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DISMISSING DETERRENCE 
Ellen D. Katz∗ 
Last June, in Shelby County v. Holder,1 the Supreme Court 
scrapped section 4(b) of the Voting Rights Act.2  That provision sub-
jected jurisdictions that met specified criteria to the preclearance re-
quirements of section 5, which, in turn, required those covered to show 
electoral changes were nondiscriminatory before implementing them.  
Invalidating 4(b) left section 5 inoperative.  The Supreme Court never-
theless insisted — over Justice Thomas’ objection — that Congress 
could reactivate preclearance if it cured the constitutional defects in 
section 4(b).3 
The proposed Voting Rights Amendment Act of 20144 (VRAA) at-
tempts to do just that.  The VRAA’s new criteria defining when juris-
dictions become subject to preclearance are acutely responsive to the 
concerns articulated in Shelby County.  The result is a preclearance 
regime that, if enacted, would operate in fewer places and demand less 
from those it regulates.5  This new regime, however, would not only be 
more targeted and less powerful, but, curiously, more vulnerable to 
challenge.  In fact, the regime would be more vulnerable precisely be-
cause it is so responsive to Shelby County.  Some background will help 
us see why. 
First enacted in 1965 and extended four times, the preclearance 
provision of the Voting Rights Act provided a remarkably effective 
mechanism to address intractable racial discrimination in voting.  De-
signed to “shift the advantage of time and inertia from the perpetrators 
of the evil to its victims,”6 preclearance prevented public officials in 
places that had used discriminatory voting practices from changing 
their electoral rules without first demonstrating to federal officials that 
the changes would be nondiscriminatory.7  The regime’s effectiveness 
lay in its ability to block discriminatory electoral changes before they 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 ∗ Ralph W. Aigler Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
 1 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 1973b (2006 & Supp. V 2011), invalidated by Shelby Cnty., 133 S.Ct. 2612. 
 3 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2631; id. at 2632 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 4 S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/ 
s1945/text, archived at http://perma.cc/K67T-GT8A. 
 5 See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes-Rohwer, Voting Rights Law and Policy in 
Transition, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 243, 243–44 (2014). 
 6 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328 (1966) (emphasis added). 
 7 See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c. 
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were implemented.  Not infrequently, it kept changes from being pro-
posed in the first instance. 
This deterrent effect bolstered the regime’s legality or, at least, was 
widely thought to do so.  Immobilized by Shelby County, preclearance 
had been vulnerable to attack since 1997 when the Supreme Court de-
cided City of Boerne v. Flores.8  That decision and its progeny9 de-
manded a far tighter connection between constitutional violations and 
congressionally crafted remedies than prior precedent had required.  In 
particular, they required extensive evidence of widespread and ongoing 
unconstitutional conduct to support congressional remedial action.  
This requirement raised the question whether the constitutional inju-
ries preclearance addressed remained sufficiently widespread and in 
need of remedy to justify the continued operation of the regime.10 
What made preclearance especially vulnerable was the fact that 
conditions for political participation in the places where it applied had 
improved markedly since Congress first crafted the statute.  The mis-
conduct that remained did not obviously rise to the level that Boerne 
and its progeny demanded.  But preclearance also differed from the 
statutes invalidated in the Boerne cases in an important respect.  The 
preclearance regime Congress reauthorized in 2006 was an operational 
regime rather than a wholly new one.  Unlike the statutes at issue in 
the Boerne cases, the preclearance requirement had been enforced for 
decades.  This meant that conditions in the places where it applied 
needed to be evaluated in light of the regime’s ongoing operational ef-
fect.  More specifically, that evaluation needed to determine whether 
observable improvements signaled a problem solved or simply one 
kept in check by the very regulatory measures in place. 
The evidence collected to support the 2006 VRA reauthorization 
made clear that preclearance better resembled an umbrella in a rain-
storm than an “elephant whistle” shooing away a non-existent threat.11  
Lower court decisions leading up to Shelby County noted that  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 8 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 9 Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Md., 132 S. Ct. 1327 (2012); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 
U.S. 627 (1999). 
 10 Boerne and some of its progeny explicitly distinguished the evidence supporting the statutes 
they invalidated from the record of egregious conduct that first prompted Congress to enact the 
preclearance regime.  See, e.g., Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524–27.  Boerne, moreover, described the tem-
poral and geographic limits of the preclearance regime as useful, albeit not essential, characteris-
tics.  Id. at 533. 
 11 Compare Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Throwing out preclear-
ance when it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like throw-
ing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”), with Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 28, Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193 (2009) (No. 08-322) 
(comparing Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to an “elephant whistle”). 
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“extensive testimony” and “concrete examples” demonstrated that the 
regime operated in an “undeniably powerful manner” to deter and 
prevent discriminatory voting changes.12  The regime’s deterrent effect 
was far from a hypothetical case being used justify the regime “to the 
crack of doom,”13 and instead had been documented by substantial 
record evidence.14 
Shelby County did not address this evidence.  Nor did it address 
whether this record as a whole — which documented a host of elec-
toral problems that persisted in covered jurisdictions despite the re-
gime’s deterrent effect — was sufficient to meet the Boerne standard.  
Indeed, the opinion did not cite Boerne at all. 
Instead, Shelby County raised a distinct and novel objection to the 
4(b) coverage formula.  The opinion observed that the discrimination 
documented in the record was not as severe as it was when Congress 
first crafted the regime; that, despite these improvements, Congress 
had not altered the statute’s pre-existing coverage formula; and that 
preclearance regulated practices beyond the ones that Congress listed 
in the original coverage formula.15  Based on these observations, the 
Court concluded that continued reliance on 4(b) was irrational and, 
accordingly, that Congress could no longer enforce preclearance in the 
places that met the 4(b) criteria.16 
Much can be said about this conclusion.17  For present purposes, 
however, what is most relevant is that the proposed amendment to 4(b) 
addresses the Court’s articulated concerns head on.  If enacted, the 
new VRAA coverage formula would subject states to preclearance if 
they amass five or more federal voting rights violations during a roll-
ing fifteen-year period, and cover local jurisdictions with three or more 
violations or just one if there also is “persistent, extremely low minori-
ty turnout” over the past fifteen years.18  This formula differs from the 
original 4(b), relies on more current conditions, and depends on voting 
rights violations that are more coextensive with the practices preclear-
ance regulates.  It thus responds to Shelby County’s concern that Con-
gress had left 4(b) unchanged, that it relied on stale conditions, and 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 12 Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Mukasey, 573 F. Supp. 2d 221, 264 (D.D.C. 2008). 
 13 Shelby Cnty.. v. Holder, 679 F.3d. 848, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting id. at 898 (Williams, J., 
dissenting)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14 See Brief of Amici Curiae Ellen D. Katz and the Voting Rights Initiative in Support of Re-
spondents, Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. 2612 (No. 12-96), 2013 WL 457386. 
 15 Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629–31.  
 16 Id. at 2631.  
 17 My take on the merits is available at Ellen D. Katz, What Was Wrong with the Record?, 12 
ELECTION L.J. 329 (2013). 
 18 S. 1945, 113th Cong. § 3(a)(1) (2014), available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/ 
bills/113/s1945/text, archived at http://perma.cc/K67T-GT8A. 
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that those conditions were insufficiently connected to the contempo-
rary problems the regime addressed.19 
Most notably, the new formula takes seriously Shelby County’s ob-
jection to the regional differentiation 4(b) produced.  Unlike the 2006 
reauthorization, which extended preclearance temporally but did not 
change its limited geographic reach, the new coverage formula “start[s] 
from scratch.”20  It does not distinguish between jurisdictions that had 
been subject to preclearance and those that had not.  Instead, it casts a 
nationwide net, using a rolling fifteen-year clock to capture contempo-
rary voting rights violations. 
That makes a lot of sense given what Shelby County said.  But it 
also comes at a cost.  Because the VRAA does not distinguish places 
once subject to preclearance from others, it defines conditions that 
warrant coverage without regard to the deterrent effect of the prior re-
gime.  The state trigger, for example, is five violations in fifteen years 
regardless of whether those violations occurred in a place that had 
been subject to preclearance prior to Shelby County.  And yet, the sig-
nificance of those violations differs depending on whether they oc-
curred in a jurisdiction that had been subject to preclearance and its 
documented deterrent effect or in a less regulated environment. 
This distinction matters if, as seems likely, Shelby County’s articu-
lated objections to 4(b) did not capture all of the Court’s concerns 
about the preclearance regime.  After all, Shelby County never re-
solved whether the record underlying the 2006 reauthorization passed 
muster under the Boerne doctrine.  Should the VRAA become law, a 
new Boerne challenge will arise and it will insist that Congress lacks 
power to subject jurisdictions to preclearance based only on a relative-
ly small number of voting rights violations that involve conduct that 
may, but need not, have violated the Constitution.  Such a challenge 
would be a serious one and, quite plausibly, stronger than the one that 
targeted the regime the VRAA is attempting to supplant.  
The challenge, of course, would not be unanswerable.  A curious 
feature of the VRAA’s new formula is that the only states it is expected 
to cover are states that were, in fact, covered previously.21  As applied 
to these states, the VRAA might more easily be found to comport with 
Boerne’s requirements, given both the specific statutory and constitu-
tional violations involved and the deterrent effect of the prior regime. 
A less targeted Boerne-based challenge to the VRAA might be re-
buffed as well.  As proposed, the new preclearance regime is arguably 
Boerne-compliant in all its potential applications, including its  
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 19 See Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2629 (noting that the coverage formula was “based on voting 
tests and access to the ballot, not vote dilution”). 
 20 See id. at 2630. 
 21 Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, supra note 5, at 243. 
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application to places that had not been subject to preclearance before 
Shelby County.  That determination, however, would need to be made 
without regard to the deterrent effect of the prior regime.  This might 
not matter, given that deterrence, no matter how well substantiated, 
was always going to be a tough sell in this Court.  And yet, going for-
ward without it leaves the new preclearance regime distinctly vulnera-
ble to attack.  It also severs the new regime from the foundational 
judgment that propelled its previous extension.  The judgment that 
preclearance offered necessary protection in the places it applied de-
pended, in large measure, on the deterrence the regime had been 
shown to provide.  Deterrence will no longer serve this function. 
